Conflicts of Interest And Market Illiquidity in Bankruptcy Auctions : Theory And Test  

Oleh:

Stromberg, Per

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 55 no. 6 (2000), page 2641-2692.
Topik: INTERESTS; models; bankruptcy; studies; financial management; liquidation
Fulltext: p 2641.pdf (324.76KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88.3 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

I develop and estimate aodel of cash auction bankruptcy using data on 205 swedish firms. The results challenge arguments that cash auctions, as compared to reorganization, are immune to conflicts of interest between claingolders to lead to inefficient liquidations. I show that a sale of the assets back to incumbent management is a common bankruptcy outcome. Sale 0 backs are more likely when they favor the bank at the expense of other creditors. On the other hand, inefficient liquidations are frequently avoided through sale - backs when markets are illiquid, that is , when industry indebtedness is high and the firm has few non specific assets.

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