Hostility in Takeovers : In The Eyes of The Beholder ?  

Oleh:

Schwert, G. William

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 55 no. 6 (2000), page 2599-2640.
Topik: hostility; hostile takeovers; stock prices; financial performance; models; studies
Fulltext: p 2599.pdf (1.56MB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88.3 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

This paper examines whether hostile takeovers can be distibguished from friendly takeovers, empirically, based on accounting and stock performance data. Much has been made of this distinctonin both the popular and the academic literature, where gains from hostile takeovers result from replacing incumbent managers and gains from friendly takeovers result from strategi csynergies. Alternatively, hostility could reflect strategic choices made by the bidder or the target. Empirical tests show that most deals described as hostile in the press are not distinguishable from friendly deals in economic terms, except the hostile transactions involve publicity as part of the bargaining process.

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