Corporate Reorganizations And Non - Cash Auctions  

Oleh:

Viswanathan, S. ; Kroff, Matthew Rhodes

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 55 no. 4 (2000), page 1807-1849.
Topik: CORPORATE; studies; corporate reorganization; auctions; efficiency; securirits; mathematical models
Fulltext: p 1807.pdf (210.69KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88.2 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

This paper extends the theory of non - cash auctions by considering the revenue and efficiency of using different securities. Research on bankruptcy and privatization suggest using non - cash auctions to increase cash - constrained bidder participation. We examine this proposal and demonstrate that securities may lead to higher revenue. However, bidders poor unless bids include debt, which results in possible repossession by the selelr. This suggests all - equity outcomes are unlikely and explains the high debt of reorganized firms. Securities also inefficiently determine bidders' incentive contracts and the firm's capital structure. Therefore, we recommend a new cash auction for an incentive contract.

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