Do Particularists Have a Coherent Notion of a Reason for Action?  

Oleh:

Lechler, Andrea

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 122 no. 4 (Jul. 2012), page 763-772.
Topik: Particularists; Coherent Notion

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.30 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Selim Berker argues that particularists do not have a coherent notion of reasons for action because they cannot show that contributory reasons always contribute to overall reason or moral judgments in accordance with their valence. I argue that Berker fails to demonstrate that particularists cannot show this to be the case. He also wrongly assumes that they need to know this to be the case to legitimately speak of reasons for action. Furthermore, Jonathan Dancy’s account of practical reasoning explains how particularists can legitimately speak of reasons for action while claiming that reasons sometimes make contributions contrary to their valence.

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