Veridicum laudare necesse est, vitam sustinere non est necesse  

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Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Journal of Pragmatics: An Interdiciplinary Journal of Language Studies vol. 37 no. 4 (Apr. 2005), page 411-431.
Topik: Misinformation; Truthfulness; Untruthfulness; Value
Fulltext: Boguslawski_A, 411-431.pdf (186.13KB)

Isi artikel

The author calls attention to the fact that truthfulness has a special place among values in that (i) an all-out non-self-contradictory approval of untruthfulness is (logically) impossible while an all-out approval of veracity is non-self-contradictory; (ii) other values and antivalues do not involve a similar asymmetry: (i) is substantiated through a reasoning which shows that (a) whoever approves of a person’s saying what is, in that person’s view, untrue, must of necessity (at least implicitly) approve, at the same time, of saying something that is, in his/her own, i.e., the ‘‘praiser’s’’, view, true, viz., of saying something which amounts to the truth of the approval of that case of untruthfulness; (b) this situation applies to just any approval of someone’s saying something (including approvals of truthful sayings). As for the external relationship of (un)truthfulness to valuation of human behaviour, first, the dominant role of human concern with (un)truthfulness is pointed out, and second, a claim is presented to the effect that one’s infringing, in what one says, upon truthfulness brings about detrimental consequences for one’s interlocutors’ image of that most important part of reality which consists in knowledge of their communication partners, in particular, of their partners’ readiness to act in this direction or another. These consequences appear to be by far more weighty from the axiological point of view than mere ‘‘matter-of-fact’’ misinformation which may result from untruthfulness, relative to propositions expressed in given utterances.

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