Meaning, rules and conversation  

Oleh:

Cockburn, David

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Language Sciences (Full Text) vol. 26 no. 2 (2004), page 105-123.
Topik: Wittgenstein L.; Language; Meaning; Conversation; Rules
Fulltext: Cockburn_David, p. 105-123.pdf (225.02KB)

Isi artikel

Wittgenstein writes:
To understand a sentence means to understand a language. My question is: what is a language, and what is its importance to the idea ofunderstanding what someone has said? Familiar ways ofdeveloping Wittgensteins
rule-following considerations, along with the idea that the notion ofa
correctness condition must be central to any account ofmeaning, do not throw light on the idea ofa language. Ifwe give central place to the idea that understanding a sentence involves grasping its logical relations with other sentences we must remember that it is the things that people say that stand in logical relations with each other, and that this is just one instance ofthe more general point that in a conversation what one person says may bear on what another says. The notion ofa
conversation may vary in its temporal stretch. Those with whom I share a language are those with whose words what I say may be connected: connected in a way analogous to that in which the remarks in a conversation are connected.

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