Feelings-as-Information Theory  

Oleh:

Schwarz, Norbert

Jenis: Article from Books - Reference
Dalam koleksi: Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology, page 289-308.
Topik: Initial Evidence; Core Themes; What Feelings Convey; Perceived Informational Value; Some Misunderstandings; From Feelings to judgements; Cognitive Tuning: Feelings and Processing Style; Feeling as a Basis of JudgmentFeelings and Processing Style

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan PKPM Nomor Panggil: 301.150.1 SAG 3 Non-tandon: tidak ada Tandon: 1

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Isi artikel

Feelings-as-information theory conceptualizes the role of subjective experiences-including moods, emotions, metacognitive experiences, and bodily sensations-in judgment. It assumes that people attend to their feelings as a source of information, with different types of information. Whereas feelings elicited by the target of judgment provide valid information, that are due to an unrelated influence can lead us astray. The use of feelings as source of information follows the same principles as the use of any other information. Most important, people do not rely on their feelings when they (correctly or incorrectly) attribute them to another source, thus undermining their informational value for the task at hand. What people conclude from a given feeling depends on the epistemic question on which they bring it to bear; hence, inferences from feelings are context-sensitive and malleable. In addition to serving as a basis of judgment, feelings inform us about the nature of our current situation and our thought processes are tuned to meet situational requirements. The chapter reviews the development of the theory, its core propositions and representative findings

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