Sufficiency and Population Ethics  

Oleh:

Huseby, Robert

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethical Perspectives: Journal of the European Ethics Network vol. 19 no. 2 (Jun. 2012), page 187-206.
Topik: Arrhenius; Casal; Parfit; Population Ethics; Sufficiency; Utilitarianism
Fulltext: 02-Huseby.pdf (264.63KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE45.19 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Climate change highlights the relevance of population ethics. Should we attempt to maximize the combined welfare of future people? Many versions of Utilitarianism hold that we should. However, most Utilitarian theories have quite unpleasant implications when applied to all future generations. In this article, I consider the prospects for a Telic Sufficientarian theory of welfare (that encompasses population ethics). According to this theory, shortfalls from a sufficient level of welfare are morally bad, and this is all that matters as far as welfare is concerned (though things other than welfare may be morally relevant). Telic Sufficientarianism avoids the familiar problems haunting Utilitarian theories, but runs into trouble elsewhere. I argue that these problems are not fatal to the view.

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