Quantified Conditionals and Conditional Excluded Middle  

Oleh:

Klinedinst, Nathan

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Journal of Semantics (Sebagian Full Text) vol. 28 no. 1 (2011), page 149–170.
Fulltext: Klinedinst_Nathan.pdf (161.13KB)

Isi artikel

Higginbotham (1986) observed that quantified conditionals have a stronger meaning than might be expected, as attested by the apparent equivalence of examples like No student will pass if he goofs off and Every student will fail if he goofs off. Higginbotham’s observation follows straightforwardly given the validity of conditional excluded middle (CEM; as observed by von Fintel & Iatridou 2002), and as such could be taken as evidence thereof (e.g. Williams forthcoming). However, the empirical status of CEM has been disputed, and it is invalid under many prominent theories of conditionals—notably Lewis (1973) for counterfactuals, also Kratzer (1979, 1991). More acutely, Higginbotham’s observation holds even for quantified counterparts of conditionals that appear not to obey CEM (Higginbotham 2003), and the standard way of explaining (away) such apparent counterexamples to the principle, a` la Stalnaker (1981), does not directly yield an account of our apparent truth-conditional intuitions about the quantified counterparts (Leslie 2009). This article provides an explanation for the latter intuitions within Stalnaker’s framework, the upshot being that CEM does remain a viable explanation, in principle, for Higginbotham’s observation.

Opini Anda

Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini!

Kembali