Can We Test the Experience Machine?  

Oleh:

Smith, Basil

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethical Perspectives: Journal of the European Ethics Network vol. 18 no. 1 (Mar. 2011), page 29-51.
Topik: Robert Nozick; Experience Machine; Moral Intuitions; Experimental Philosophy
Fulltext: 03-smith.pdf (268.19KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE45.17 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Robert Nozick famously asks us whether we would plug in to an ‘experience machine’, or whether we would insist upon ‘living in contact with reality’. Felipe De Brigard, after conducting a series of empirical ‘inverted’ experience machine studies, suggests that this is a false dilemma. Rather, he says, '…the fact is that people tend to prefer the state of affairs they are in currently,' or the status quo. In this paper, I argue that these studies are a test case for ‘experimental philosophy’ as such. Specifically, I argue that De Brigard offers a series of faulty studies, and so, reaches unfounded conclusions. More generally, I argue that certain philosophical thought experiments cannot be tested empirically at all, and this limits what experimental philosophy can do.

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