Moral Realism and Two-Dimensional Semantics  

Oleh:

Henning, Tim

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 121 no. 4 (Jul. 2011), page 717-748.
Topik: Moral Realists; Moral Judgement; Attitudinal

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.33 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Moral realists can, and should, allow that the truth-conditional content of moral judgements is in part attitudinal. I develop a two-dimensional semantics that embraces attitudinal content while preserving realist convictions about the independence of moral facts from attitudes. Relative to worlds "considered as counterfactual," moral terms rigidly track objective, response-independent properties. But relative to different ways the actual world turns out to be, they nonrigidly track whatever properties turn out to be the objects of our relevant attitudes. This theory provides realists with a satisfactory account or Moral Twin Earth cases and an improved response to Blackburn's supervenience argument.

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