Asymmetrical Virtue Particuralism  

Oleh:

Stangl, Rebecca

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 121 no. 1 (Oct. 2010), page 37-57.
Topik: Right Action; Virtue; Virtuousness; Wrong-Making

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.31 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

In this essay, I defend an account of right action that I shall call "asymmetrical virtue particularism." An action, on this account, is right just insofar as it is overall virtuous. But the virtuousness of an action in any particular respect, X, is deontically variant; it can fail to be right-making, either because it is deontically irrelevant or because it is wrong-making. Finally, the account is asymmetrical insofar as the viciousness of actions is not deontically variant; if any action is vicious in some respect Y, then Y is always a wrong-making feature of any action whatever that has Y.

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