Methanical Contextualism Defended  

Oleh:

Björnsson, Gunnar

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 121 no. 1 (Oct. 2010), page 7-36.
Topik: Contextualist Account; Normative Judgements; Normative Disagreement; Deliberation and Advice; Deliberating Agents; Truth

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.31 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

We defend a contextualist account of normative judgements as relativized both to (i) information and to (ii) starndards or ends against recent objections that turn on practices of normative disagreement. Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane argue that information-relative contextualism cannot accommodate the connection between deliberation and advice. In response, we suggest that they misidentify the basic concerns of deliberating agents, which are not to settle the truth of particular propositions but to promote certain values. For pragmatic reasons, semantic assessments of normative claims sometimes are evaluations of propositions other than those asserted. Other writers have raised parallel objections to standard-relative contextualism, particularly about moral claims; we argue for a parallel solution.

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