The natural consequence of finding an infringement of
Article 102 TFEU is to offset the harm to consumer welfare by
restoring competition through effective remedies. As big data
constitutes the most vital resource in data-driven markets, a dominant
undertaking can exclude its rivals from accessing user data and thus
deprive them of scale in markets that are characterised by network
effects. Indeed, the European Commission found Google guilty of
excluding its rivals in the Android licensing case by adopting this
strategy. It is, however, unclear as to which remedy can most
efficiently restore competition in such cases. This paper analyses the
viability of mandatory data sharing as a remedy to restore
competition in the affected market. The paper approaches this
research question from both theoretical and practical standpoints.
First, it analyses the viability of mandatory data sharing remedy from
legal, economic and, technological perspective, followed by an
assessment of such a remedy within the framework of the GDPR.
Based on this comprehensive investigation, it concludes that
mandatory data sharing is not the optimal solution to remedy loss to
consumer welfare. In view of this, reliance can be placed on other
behavioural and structural remedies |