Detail The Loss Compensation Practice of Japanese Securities Companies   Oleh:  Hebner, Kevin J. ; Park, Young S. Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: JAPAN AND THE WORLD ECONOMY vol. 7 no. 3 (1995), page 263-290. Topik: securities; loss compensation; securities companies Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ47.5 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel This paper presents a simple game theoretical analysis of the loss compensation practice of Japanese securities companies. Securities companies operate in an oligopolistic market, competing for corporate clients to whom they provide a number of services (including underwriting, fund management and brokerage). We demonstrate that providing loss compensation (or a guaranteed minimum return) is the dominant strategy of securities companies when : (1) commissions are regulated ; (2) the securities industry is oligopolistic ; and (3) corporate fund managers exhibit a high degree of risk aversion. These findings suggest several regulatory changes that public policy makers can enact to eliminate the economic incentives for the loss compensation practice. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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