Detail Fairness, Efficiency, and Externalities   Oleh:  Nelson, Julianne Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: JAPAN AND THE WORLD ECONOMY vol. 7 no. 1 (1995), page 85-104. Topik: efficiency; fairness; efficiency; externalities Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ47.5 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel While some recommend the Coase theorem as a guide for choosing among feasible legal rules, others condemn the theorem as intellectually bankrupt. This disagreement arises primarily because the theorem does not suffice to define a unique social contract (and hence a specific theory of rights). To illustrate the scope of necessary assumptions, I use Gauthier's cooperative bargaining solution to resolve the externality problem that arises when track fires destroy crops in nearby fields. By analyzing the problem as specified by Coase, I indicate how assumptions about fairness and the structure of bargaining affect the practical implications of Coase's insights. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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