Scientific discovery is an important moment in scientific pursuit, but only a few philosophers
of science appreciate this moment as a logical issue. Starting from his understanding
that all thought contains components of which we are subsidiarily aware in focal content
of thinking, Michael Polanyi puts out his thesis that scientific discovery cannot be justified
by a series of strictly explicit operations but by merely invoking deeper forms of commitment
in sighting the problem and the vision of reality. This article will delve into Polanyi’s
notion of scientific discovery in three sections: the first section is dealing with Polanyi’s
concept of heuristic philosophy which tones that discovery of problem is the primary requisite
of a good scientist to vision reality, the second discusses the role of intellectual passions
in scientific justification, and the third focuses on the ontological implication of scientific
discovery that it guides us to comprehension of something real both tangible and
intangible. The article concludes that since scientific discovery involves the creative and
imaginative appeal to reality, its rationality must be counted on by its logical structure and
personal experiences in scientific community. |