Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology  

Oleh:

Hills, Alison

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 120 no. 1 (Oct. 2009), page 94-127.
Topik: moral testimony; moral beliefs; pessimist; nonmoral issues; moral matters; moral question

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.28 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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The status of "moral testimony" is controversial. Consider the following example: Eleanor has always enjoyed eating meat but has recently realized that it raises some moral issues. Rather than thinking further about these, however, she talks to a friend, who tells her that eating meat is wrong. Eleanor knows that her friend is normally trustworthy and reliable, so she believes her and accepts that eating meat is wrong. Many people believe that there are strong reasons not to form moral beliefs on the say-so of others, as Eleanor does. I will call these people "pessimist" about moral testimony. Pessimist do not think that moral testimony is entirely worthless. They agree that it is acceptable for children to learn most of their moral beliefs through testimony. And adults may reasonably base some beliefs on testimony, for example, about relevant nonmoral issues (who did what to whom) from which they can form their own moral views. Asking for others people's advice about moral matters and taking that advice seriously is clearly legitimate. But once you have reached maturity as an adult and have the ability to think about moral questions by yourself-as Eleanor can-it seems, at least to pessimist, that you have strong reasons to do so, indeed that refusing to do so is unacceptable.

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