Signalling Games Select Horn Strategies  

Oleh:

Rooy, Robert Van

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Linguistics and Philosophy=> ada di SpringerLink 1997(vol.1) - Mutakhir; JSTOR vol. 27 no. 4 (Aug. 2004), page 493-527.
Fulltext: Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 493-527.pdf (4.05MB)

Isi artikel

In this paper I will discuss why (un) marked expressions typically get an (un)marked interpretation: Horn's division of pragmatic labor. It is argued that it is a con ventional fact that we use language this way. This convention will be explained in terms of the equilibria of signalling games introduced by Lewis (1969), but now in an evolutionary setting. I will also relate this signalling game analysis with Parikh's (1991, 2000, 2001) game-theoretical analysis of successful communication, which in turn is compared with Blutner's: 2000) bi-directional optimality theory.

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