Thought And Circumstance  

Oleh:

ARONSZAJN, MARK

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Journal of Semantics (Sebagian Full Text) vol. 6 no. 1 (Jan. 1988), page 271-307.
Topik: Thought; Circumstance;
Fulltext: vol 6, no 1, p 271-307.pdf (1.58MB)

Isi artikel

A long-standing logical and philosophical tradition holds that there are such things as objects of thought, things of the sort a person may be said to be thinking - objects not only of doxastic thoughts (thoughts to the effect that something or other is the case), but of wonderings, wishings, hoping: and desirings, etc. Virtually all propotranents of this tradition have supposed that the objects of thought are propositions, the (primary) bearers of truth-value. There are various proposals within the tradition about what propositions are: but all standard conceptions hold, roughly, that a proposition is circumstantial in character - something akin to a state, or condition, a way things could be. I argue that objects of thought are not circumstantial in character. So the view that they are propositions, standardly conceived, cannot be right. The argument centers on the case of nondoxastic thoughts - wonderings and wishings, in particular. The bulk of this paper, then, is devoted to laying out an alternative conception of the objects of thought. This conception supports the traditional idea that objects of thought are what we express by our utterance of sentences. Moreover, on this new view, a partial account is afforded of what things are expressed by non-assertoric sentences - by sentences in moods other than the indicative

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