The Evolution of Norms  

Oleh:

Bendor, Jonathan ; Swistak, Piotr

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: AJS: American Journal of Sociology vol. 106 no. 06 (May 2001), page 1493-1545.
Topik: Problems with the Existing; The Proposed Solution; Evolutionary Analysis; Evolutionary Game Theory
Fulltext: A13 Vol. 106, No. 6 (May 2001) p1493.PDF (250.98KB)

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Perpustakaan PKPM Nomor Panggil: A13 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Social norms that induce us to reward or punish people not for what they did to us but for what they did to other members of one’s group have long been thought as sine qua non sociological and thus impossible to explain in terms of rational choice. This article shows how social norms can be deductively derived from principles of (boundedly) rational choice as mechanisms that are necessary to stabilize behaviors in a large class of evolutionary games.

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