Theories of Truth and Truth-Value Gaps  

Oleh:

Hugly, Philip ; Sayward, Charles

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Linguistics and Philosophy=> ada di SpringerLink 1997(vol.1) - Mutakhir; JSTOR vol. 16 no. 6 (Dec. 1993), page 551-559.
Fulltext: 25001528.pdf (946.89KB)

Isi artikel

The fact that a group of axioms use the word 'true' does not guarantee that that group of axioms yields a theory of truth. For Davidson the derivability of certain biconditionals from the axioms is what guarantees this. We argue that the test does not work. In particular, we argue that if the object language has truth-value gaps, the result of applying Davidson's definition of a theory of truth is that no correct theory of truth for the language is possible.

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