Managing Risk in the New World  

Oleh:

Kaplan, Robert S. ; Mikes, Anette ; Simons, Robert ; Tufano, Peter ; Hofmann, Michael

Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Harvard Business Review bisa di lihat di link (http://web.b.ebscohost.com/ehost/command/detail?sid=f227f0b4-7315-44a4-a7f7-a7cd8cbad80b%40sessionmgr114&vid=12&hid=105&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=bth&jid=HBR) vol. 87 no. 10 (Oct. 2009), page 68.
Topik: Risk Management; Credit Bubble; Financial Markets; Innovation

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: HH10.39 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Five experts discuss the future of enterprise risk management. David Champion: How predictable was the financial meltdown of 2008–2009? Was it a Black Swan event or, rather, analogous to the next big California earthquake—something you know will happen though you don’t know when? Peter Tufano: Many of the elements of the crisis were being talked about long before it happened. Analysts had been questioning the sustainability of the subprime business well before the meltdown. Macroeconomists had been worrying about the U.S. current account deficit. I myself had been looking at obviously unsustainable household saving rates and debt levels. Other people were writing about the imperfections of ratings models. What we didn’t see was how the elements were interacting. And that meant we were blind to the risk that the whole system would break down. Michael Hofmann: I agree. The crash was essentially the bursting of a classic credit bubble. The interesting part was what the bursting revealed, which was just how concentrated the financial system had become. It also highlighted a classic behavioral bias. The main features of the financial system had been in place for some 25 years, and we had gotten pretty comfortable with the way things were. We were all relying on data from this largely stable period. It’s very hard in these situations to stand up and prophesy disaster. Robert Simons: There has certainly been a strong pattern of risk-taking behavior in the financial sector, and in my view that is because we had three enabling conditions in place at once. First, the innovations in financial engineering that were developed over the past decade created an opportunity to take on more risk through new products. This is not new, of course. Breakthroughs in transportation, telecommunications, and computing all created similar opportunities for risk taking. Second, you need motivation in the form of performance pressure, and the financial markets supplied this in spades. There’s been intense pressure on executives to deliver sales growth, a larger market share, and ever-rising stock prices. But again, nothing in the past few years would suggest that this pressure had suddenly intensified. What was new was the third ingredient, which I call rationalization—the belief that a particular behavior is economically and morally justifiable. The shareholder value principle—that social welfare is somehow best served if managers focus exclusively on delivering the maximum value to stock owners—was one such rationalization. And rationalizations like that made it much easier for managers everywhere to take on risk that they would otherwise have avoided. Risk became the rule rather than the exception, which explains the scale of the crisis.

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