Monism, Pluralism, and Rational Regret  

Oleh:

Hurka, Thomas

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 106 no. 3 (Apr. 1996), page 555.
Topik: Monism; Pluralism; Regret

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.24 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

According to an increasingly widespread view, ethics concerns the evaluation not only of acts and intentions but also of attitudes and feelings. In different circumstances different attitudes can be appropriate, rational, or morally called for. As Aristotle held, the morally virtuous person not only acts and intends but also feels appropriately or well. Much recent discussion of appropriate feelings has focused on a particular context: where you had a choice between acts that would produce different goods and chose one act, and one good, over the rest. In Section I of this article I argue that issues about the division of appropriate attitudes. In Section II I consider a calim often made about feelings after a choice: that regret for a forgone lesser good can be rational only given a pluralistic rather than a monistic theory of good. Againts this widely accepted view I argue that monism, too. Allows for rational regret. In Section III I consider the implications of this argument for our understanding of pluralism. Even if there are independent reasons to prefer pluralistic theories of the good, the argument with a moderate rather than an immense number of generic goods.

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