The Rationally of Complying With Rules: Paradox Resolved  

Oleh:

Goldman, Alan

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 116 no. 3 (Apr. 2006), page 453-470.
Topik: Rationally; Rules; Paradox

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.24 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

We rationally impose rules on ourselves when the collective outcome of doing so better than the outcome in which all act on independent judgement. Some rules, those which solve pure coordination problems, help us to achieve both individually and collectively optimal outcomes, The rule to drive on the right produces an outcome that is a Nash equilibrium ( no one can do better, given the actions of others) and a coordination equilibrium ( no one does better by others acting differently).

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