Moral Responsibilty and nornmative Ingnorance: Answering a New Skeptical Challenge  

Oleh:

Fitzpatrick, William J.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 118 no. 4 (Jul. 2008), page 589-613.
Topik: Moral Responsibilty; Normative Ignorance

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.26 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Philosophical doubts about moral responsibility have typically been rooted in worries about free agency in the face of causal determinism, culminating in familiar metaphysical arguments against the very possibility of moral responsibility. Recently, however, a skeptical argument has emerged that is simulataneosly less ambitious and potentially more challenging to many of our common beliefs and practices concerning responsibility. Recently, however, a skeptical argument has emerged that is simultaneoulsy less ambitious and potentially more challenging to many of our common beliefs and practices concerning responsibility. It is less ambiytious because the aim is show not that agents cannot in principle be responsible for what they do but only that the ascription of responsibility or blame for bad actions is never warranted in any particular case. Since this more modest argument dose not rely on the truth of determinism, howver, the worries it raises for attributions of moral responsibility are likewise not mitigated by familiar compatibilist strategies for rescuing moral responsibility from the threat of determinism. The problems remain whatever one conludes about the underlying metaphysical issues.

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