Infant Industry Protection With Oligopoly and Learning-by-Doing  

Oleh:

To, T.

Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine
Dalam koleksi: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, The vol. 3 no. 3 (1994), page 199-212.
Topik: oligopoly; infant; industry protection; oligopoly; learning - by - doing

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ35 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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I use a simple two - period learning - by -doing model to examine optimal home country protection policy. In some cases, as in Dasgupta and Stiglitz (Oxford Economic Papers 40 (1988), 246 - 68), the home government will impose an import ban to protect the home firm from foreign competition. On the other hand, a protective tariff often provides greater welfare than when an import ban is imposed. In these cases, the first - period dynamic tariff is greater than the static Brander and Spencer 'profit shifting tariff'. Protection in the form either of a tariff or an import ban encourages the home firm to invest in current output which reduces future costs. In addition to dynamic profit shifting, protection can bc valuable because the home firm does not consider the effect of its current learning on future consumer surplus. Tariffs can thus encourage the growth of infant industries while benefiting consumers in the future. Furthermore, the home firm can have an incentive to price below cost if the potential cost savings are sufficiently valuable.

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