Hubungan Kebijakan Hutang, Insider Ownership dan Kebijakan Dividen Dalam Mekanisme Pengawasan Masalah Agensi di Indonesia  

Oleh:

Harjito, D. Agus ; Nurfauziah

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah nasional - terakreditasi DIKTI
Dalam koleksi: Jurnal Akuntansi & Auditing Indonesia vol. 10 no. 2 (Dec. 2006), page 161.
Topik: Insider Ownership; Debt Policy; Dividend Policy; Agency Problem; Substitutability

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: AA70.2 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

This study investigates the substitution relationship (substitutability) among debt policy, insider ownership, and dividend policy as the agency problem control mechanism in Indonesia. If the substitution relationship exists among the agency control mechanisms, the agency problem can be reduced through this relationship. Reducing the agency problem as a result can increase the firm's value proxied by Tobin's Q. The result of this study indicate that the substitutability among debt policy, insider ownership, and dividend policy as agency problem control mechanism does not exist effectively in Indonesia. Actually there is substitutability relationship among tyhe control mechanisms, but it is not effective.

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