Property Rights, Corruption And The Allocation Of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach  

Oleh:

Acemoglu, Daron ; Verdier, Thierry

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 108 no. 450 (Sep. 1998), page 1381-1403.
Fulltext: 1381.pdf (443.04KB)

Isi artikel

We consider an economy where contracts are necessary to encourage investments. Contract enforcement requires that a fraction of the agents work in the public sector and do not accept bribes. We ®nd that: (1) It may be optimal to allow some corruption and not enforce property rights fully. (2) Less developed economies may choose lower levels of property right enforcement and more corruption. (3) There may exist a `free-lunch' such that over a certain range it is possible simultaneously to reduce corruption, increase investment, and achieve a better allocation of talent.

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