Detail The Economics of Fraudulent Accounting (Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming) Bibliografi Author: Kedia, Simi ; Philippon, Thomas Bahasa: (EN )     Penerbit: Oxford University Press     Tempat Terbit: Oxford    Tahun Terbit: 2006     Jenis: Article - diterbitkan di jurnal ilmiah internasional Fulltext: THE ECONOMICS OF FRAUDULENT ACCOUNTING_paper.pdf (671.72KB; 4 download) The Economics of Fraudulent Accounting.pdf (307.4KB; 2 download) [Informasi yang berkaitan dengan koleksi ini di internet] Abstract We argue that earnings management and fraudulent accounting have important economic consequences. In a model where the costs of earnings management are endogenous, we show that in equilibrium, bad managers hire and invest too much in order to pool with the good managers. This behavior distorts the allocation of economic resources among firms. We test the predictions of the model using new historical and firm-level data. First, we show that periods of high stock market valuations are systematically followed by large increases in reported frauds. We then show that during periods of suspicious accounting, firms hire and invest excessively, while insiders exercise options and sell stocks. When the misreporting is detected, firms shed labor and capital and productivity improves. In the aggregate, our model seems able to account for periods of jobless and investment-less growth. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Lihat Sejarah Pengadaan  Konversi Metadata   Kembali

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