Detail Financial Fraud, Director Reputation, and Shareholder Wealth (Journal of Financial Economics 86, 2007) Bibliografi Author: Fich, Eliezer M. ; Shivdasani, Anil Topik: Director reputation; Financial fraud; Interlocking directorships; Class action lawsuits Bahasa: (EN )     Penerbit: Elsevier     Tempat Terbit: New York    Tahun Terbit: 2007     Jenis: Article - diterbitkan di jurnal ilmiah internasional Fulltext: Financial Fraud, Director Reputation, and Shareholder Wealth.pdf (162.85KB; 3 download) Abstract We investigate the reputational impact of financial fraud for outside directors based on a sample of firms facing shareholder class action lawsuits. Following a financial fraud lawsuit, outside directors do not face abnormal turnover on the board of the sued firm but experience a significant decline in other board seats held. The decline in other directorships is greater for more severe cases of fraud and when the outside director bears greater responsibility for monitoring fraud. Interlocked firms that share directors with the sued firm exhibit valuation declines at the lawsuit filing. When fraud-affiliated directors depart from boards of interlocked firms, these firms experience a significant increase in valuation. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Lihat Sejarah Pengadaan  Konversi Metadata   Kembali

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