Detail Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO (The American Economic Review, Vol.88 No.1, March 1998) Bibliografi Author: Hermalin, Benjamin E. ; Weisbach, Michael S. Topik: CEO Bahasa: (EN )     Penerbit: American Economic Association     Tempat Terbit: Nashville    Tahun Terbit: 1998     Jenis: Article - diterbitkan di jurnal ilmiah internasional Fulltext: Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO.pdf (1.15MB; 0 download) [Informasi yang berkaitan dengan koleksi ini di internet] Abstract How can boards be chosen through a process partially controlled by the CEO, yet, in many instances, still be effective monitors of him? We offer an answer based on a model in which board effectiveness is a function of its independence. This, in turn, is a function of negotiations (implicit or explicit) between existing directors and the CEO over who will fill vacancies on the board. The CEO's bargaining power over the board-selection process comes from his perceived ability relative to potential successors. Many empirical findings about board structure and performance arise as equilibrium phenomena of this model. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Lihat Sejarah Pengadaan  Konversi Metadata   Kembali

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