Detail The Impact of Performance-based Compensation on Misreporting (Journal of Financial Economics 79, 2006) Bibliografi Author: Burns, Natasha ; Kedia, Simi Topik: Restatments; Misreporting; Compensation; Options Bahasa: (EN )     Penerbit: Elsevier     Tempat Terbit: New York    Tahun Terbit: 2006     Jenis: Article - diterbitkan di jurnal ilmiah internasional Fulltext: The impact of performance based compensation on misreporting.pdf (282.5KB; 5 download) Abstract This paper examines the effect of CEO compensation contracts on misreporting. We find that the sensitivity of the CEO's option portfolio to stock price is significantly positively related to the propensity to misreport. We do not find that the sensitivity of other components of CEO compensation, i.e., equity, restricted stock, long-term incentive payouts and salary and bonus have any significant impact on the propensity to misreport. Relative to other components of compensation, stock options are associated with stronger incentives to misreport because convexity in CEO wealth introduced by stock options limits the downside risk on detection of the misreporting. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Lihat Sejarah Pengadaan  Konversi Metadata   Kembali

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