Detail Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors (Journal of Finance 59, 2004) Bibliografi Author: Yermack, David Topik: Remuneration; Retention; Reputation Incentives Bahasa: (EN )     Penerbit: Blackwell Publishing     Tempat Terbit: Oxford    Tahun Terbit: 2004     Jenis: Article - diterbitkan di jurnal ilmiah internasional Fulltext: Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors.pdf (198.74KB; 4 download) Abstract I study incentives received by outside directors in Fortune 500 firms from compensation, replacement, and the opportunity to obtain other directorships. Previous research has only shown these relations to apply under limited circumstances such as financial distress. Together these incentive mechanisms provide directors with wealth increases of approximately 11 cents per $1,000 rise in firm value. Although smaller than the performance sensitivities of CEOs, outside directors’ incentives imply a change in wealth of about $285,000 for a 1 standard deviation (SD) change in typical firm performance. Cross-sectional patterns of director equity awards conform to agency and financial theories. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Lihat Sejarah Pengadaan  Konversi Metadata   Kembali

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