Detail CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation (NBER Working Paper, March 2006) Bibliografi Author: Jenter, Dirk ; Kanaan, Fadi Topik: CEO Turnover; Performance Evaluation; Corporate Boards Bahasa: (EN )     Penerbit: National Bureau of Economic Research     Tempat Terbit: New York    Tahun Terbit: 2006     Jenis: Papers/Makalah Fulltext: Ceo Turnover And Relative Performance Evaluation.pdf (342.9KB; 8 download) [Informasi yang berkaitan dengan koleksi ini di internet] Abstract This paper examines whether CEOs are fired after bad firm performance caused by factors beyond their control. Standard economic theory predicts that corporate boards filter out exogenous industry and market shocks to firm performance when deciding on CEO retention. Using a new handcollected sample of 1,590 CEO turnovers from 1993 to 2001, we document that CEOs are significantly more likely to be dismissed from their jobs after bad industry and bad market performance. A decline in the industry component of firm performance from its 75th to its 25th percentile increases the probability of a forced CEO turnover by approximately 50 percent. This finding is robust to controls for firm-specific performance. The result is at odds with the prior empirical literature which showed that corporate boards filter exogenous shocks from CEO dismissal decisions in samples from the 1970s and 1980s. Our findings suggest that the standard CEO turnover model is too simple to capture the empirical relation between performance and forced CEO turnovers, and we evaluate several extensions to the standard model. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Lihat Sejarah Pengadaan  Konversi Metadata   Kembali

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