| When I first read Saul Kripke’s book, Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language, it struck me forcibly that something was right about the idea that meaning something by a word is not simply a matter of how one is disposed to use the word. That one means plus by ‘plus’ seems to have implications concerning how one should use the word. But it is hard to see how merely being disposed to use a word in certain ways can, by itself, have such implications. A similar issue arises in connection with concepts. It looks plausible that possessing a concept has implications for how it should be employed. If possessing a concept is simply a matter of having certain dispositions, including belief-forming dispositions, then it is hard to see how that can, by itself, have such implications. These thoughts bring others in their train. Beliefs and intentions are psychological states in some way linked to dispositions to thought or action. Yet they seem to incur certain commitments. Having an intention, for instance, seems to commit us to doing whatever is necessary to carry it out. To be so committed is a normative matter—it relates, somehow, to what one should do. But that one has an intention is generally supposed to be a non-normative consideration. So how does the supposedly non-normative consideration relate to the consideration about commitment? |