Competition between Individuals and Groups: Do Incentives Matter?: A Group Adaptiveness Perspective  

Oleh:

Lodewijkx, Hein F.M. ; Wildschut, Tim ; Syroit, Jef E.E.M. ; Visser, Lieuwe ; Rabbie, Jaap M.

Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine
Dalam koleksi: Small Group Research vol. 30 no. 4 (2008), page 387-404.
Fulltext: 387.pdf (85.94KB)

Isi artikel

In their research on individual-group discontinuity using Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG), Schopler, Insko, and associates observed that groups were more competitive than individuals. Alternatively, we propose that this effect can be interpreted as a group-adaptiveness phenomenon. In a 2 (individuals vs. groups) ´ 2 (low vs. high incentives to cooperate) PDG study, individuals groups played against a cooperative opponent. Individual-group discontiunity was found when incentives to cooperate were low, but not when incentives were high. Results further suggest that the stronger intergroup competition observed in past discontinuity research may have been triggered and perpetuated by between-group violations of cooperative proposals. These findings are consistent with our group adaptiveness perspective, which proposes that groups are not invariably more competitive than individuals, but that they are more likely to adapt their behaviors to variations in the task and/or social environment in an attempt to attain important group goals.

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