Publicity of Debate and the Incentive to Dissent: Evidence from the US Federal Reserve  

Oleh:

Meade, Ellen E. ; Stasavage, David

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 118 no. 528 (Apr. 2008), page 695.
Topik: Publicity; Debate; Incentive; US Federal Reserve
Fulltext: 695.pdf (156.64KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.28 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Transparency in committee decision making may have clear benefits by making members more accountable to outside observers. We consider one potential cost: the possibility that publishing records of deliberations will make members more reluctant to offer dissenting opinions. We construct a model that compares incentives for members with 'career concerns' to voice dissent when deliberations occur in public or in private. We test the model using an original dataset based on deliberations of the Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee, asking whether the FOMC's 1993 decision to begin releasing transcripts of its meetings has altered incentives for dissent. We find evidence that this is indeed the case.

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