Unforeseen Contingency and Renegotiation with Asymmetric Information  

Oleh:

Lee, Jihong

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 118 no. 528 (Apr. 2008), page 678.
Topik: Unforeseen Contingency; Renegotiation; Asymmetric Information
Fulltext: 678.pdf (142.88KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.28 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

Lihat Detail Induk

Isi artikel

This article considers a buyer–seller contracting model in which the seller possesses private information about all relevant aspects of the state of nature, including how much each action is worth to the buyer. I argue that, given asymmetric information, the buyer may not entirely dismiss an unforeseen contingency claim by the seller. Then, if the buyer lacks the foresight/awareness to 'expect the unexpected', the model admits an equilibrium in which a seemingly complete contract is written and then renegotiated along its outcome path to generate inefficiency ex post.

Opini Anda

Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini!

Kembali