Persistent Court Corruption  

Oleh:

Bond, Philip

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 118 no. 531 (Aug. 2008), page 1333.
Topik: Persistent; Court; Corruption
Fulltext: 1333.pdf (611.81KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.29 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

Lihat Detail Induk

Isi artikel

Corruption among court officials varies widely across countries and exhibits considerable intertemporal persistence. I present a model of court corruption in which there are multiple equilibria, differentiated by corruption levels. In the model, courts provide incentives for individuals to take/abstain from certain actions. High corruption levels undermine incentive provision and necessitate larger penalties. Larger penalties in turn increase the potential bribes that a court official can collect and so attract more dishonest officials to court employment. This feedback effect generates multiple equilibria. Paying court officials wages sufficiently above the market-clearing rate can eliminate the high corruption equilibrium.

Opini Anda

Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini!

Kembali