Glass Ceilings or Sticky Floors? Statistical Discrimination in a Dynamic Model of Hiring and Promotion  

Oleh:

Bjerk, David

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 118 no. 530 (Jul. 2008), page 961.
Topik: Glass Ceilings; Sticky Floors; Statistical Discrimination; Dynamic Model; Hiring; Promotion
Fulltext: 961.pdf (144.92KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.28 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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I show that when two groups differ in (i) their average skill level, (ii) the precision with which they can signal their skill prior to entering the labour market, and/or (iii) the frequency with which they have the opportunity to signal their skill prior to entering the labour market, then even if firms become increasingly informed regarding each worker's skill over time, equally skilled workers from different groups will have different likelihoods of making it to top jobs in the economy, even though there is no discrimination when it comes to promotion to these top jobs.

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