A Theory of Distributional Conflict, Voluntarism and Segregation  

Oleh:

Horstmann, Ignatius J. ; Scharf, Kimberley A.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 118 no. 527 (Mar. 2008), page 427.
Topik: Theory; Distributional Conflict; Voluntarism; Segregation
Fulltext: 427.pdf (218.21KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.27 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Along with the rise in income inequality in the US, there is evidence of a simultaneous move towards fiscal devolution and increased government reliance on private provision of public goods. This article argues that these phenomena are related. We describe a model of jurisdiction and policy formation in which the structure of government provision is endogenous and public good provision levels are determined by a political process that can exploit private motives for voluntary giving. The model predicts that an increase in income inequality leads to decentralisation, with local jurisdictions becoming more income-homogeneous than the population as a whole. This reduction in local income heterogeneity, combined with a reduced tax base, results in increased reliance by government on private provision.

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