Bank Loans, Bonds, and Information Monopolies across the Business Cycle  

Oleh:

Santos, Joao A. C. ; Winton, Andrew

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 63 no. 3 (Jun. 2008), page 1315-1359.
Topik: Bank Loans; Bonds; and Information Monopolies; Business Cycle
Fulltext: P 1315.pdf (355.88KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Theory suggests that banks' private information about borrowers lets them hold up borrowers for higher interest rates. Since hold-up power increases with borrower risk, banks with exploitable information should be able to raise their rates in recessions by more than is justified by borrower risk alone. We test this hypothesis by comparing the pricing of loans for bank-dependent borrowers with the pricing of loans for borrowers with access to public debt markets, controlling for risk factors. Loan spreads rise in recessions, but firms with public debt market access pay lower spreads and their spreads rise significantly less in recessions.

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