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The Use of "Most-Favored-Nation" Clauses in Settlement of Litigation
Oleh:
Spier, Kathryn E.
Jenis:
Article from Bulletin/Magazine
Dalam koleksi:
The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 34 no. 1 (2003)
,
page 78-95.
Topik:
litigation
;
most - favored nation
;
settlement
;
litigation
Ketersediaan
Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi)
Nomor Panggil:
RR10
Non-tandon:
1 (dapat dipinjam: 0)
Tandon:
tidak ada
Lihat Detail Induk
Isi artikel
Many settlement contracts in litigation involving multiple plaintiffs (or multiple defendants) include "most - favored - nation" (MFN) clauses. If an early settlement includes an MFN and the defendant settles later with another plaintiff for more money, the early settlers receive these terms too. If the defendant knows the aggregate distribution of expected awards but cannot discriminate among the privately informed plaintiffs, then MFNs avoid costly delay. Plaintiffs with weak cases settle early rather than on the courthouse steps. The effects of MFN s on the settlement terms, plaintiffs' welfare, litigation rates, and the defendant's ex ante incentives are considered and alternative explanations are explored.
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