Rawls’ Political Liberalism: Foundations and Principles  

Oleh:

Van De Putte, Andre

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethical Perspectives: Journal of the European Ethics Network vol. 2 no. 3 (Sep. 1995), page 107-129.
Topik: Pluralism; Reasonable Pluralism
Fulltext: André Van de Putte.PDF (267.59KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE45.1 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Since the publication of A Theory of Justice, Rawis has not ceased to reflect on the range and significance of his theory. Political Liberalism presents the (provisional?) results of his ongoing considerations.2 Rawls situates political liberal¬ism within the issue of religious pluralism. According to him, political liberalism began when the conflict between religions and conceptions of truth was taken seriously rather than in the efforts to limit the absolute power of princes (xxiv-vi). He endeavours to find an answer to the question how an honest society of persons can be viable when there is deep division on matters of religion. What can society’s foundation be when social unity can no longer ground itself in a consensus on truth, on a general and comprehensive religious doctrine?3 With this, however, the context of political liberalism is only partly outlined. According to Rawis, this context is determined in part by the acceptance of an epistemological datum which caused the solution proposed by the Enlightenment for the problem of pluralism to fail. Indeed, it is apparently impossible to rationally devise a secular, comprehensive doctrine which would adequately convince everyone and thereby become the foundation of society. The “burdens of judgement,” the many hazards involved in the use of reason, imply that different people will determine what they consider to be the relevant facts, values and arguments in different ways (xviii; 5Sf.) People make judgements about moral truths, “all things considered: that is, taking into consideration what they see as all relevant moral and political values and all relevant facts (as each doctrine determines)” (xx, italics mine). What results is that comprehensive doctrines, which can only exercise their power of conviction among those who share the same principles or points of departure, can no longer be measured by the same standard. Rawis’ formulation of the problem, therefore, is determined more by reasonable pluralism than by pluralism as such (63-66; 144: 179). The ‘dissensus’ which defines the problem of political liberalism is not primarily rooted in self-interest, irrationality and bad faith. Rather, it is a ‘dissensus’ between reasonable people who, even after painstaking and rational reflection, cannot reach a consensus on the truth. In Rawis’ opinion, such reasonable pluralism is not a passing contingency of history. Instead, it is the normal result of human reason operating within the framework of the free institutions which developed in the constitutional regimes after the wars of religion (xvi; xxiv; 36-37). Rawls is well aware, of course, that much division has its roots in bad faith, etc. (55). The phenomenon of violence, which has traditionally played an important role in political philosophy, does not, however, define the problem at issue in his ideal theory. It is the task of the non-ideal theory to determine how one must deal with those who choose violence. It is for this reason that Rawis only cursorily suggests that societies should contain irrational, comprehensive doctrines in order to prevent them from undermining the unity and justice of the society in question (xvii; 64, n. 19).

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