Sidgwick's False Friends  

Oleh:

Shaver, Robert

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 107 no. 2 (Jan. 1997), page 314-320.
Topik: False; Friends; Naturalists; James Griffin

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.5 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

In recent paper in Ethics, David Sobel and Connie Rosati cite Henry Sidgwick as holding a "full information" account of the good. John Rawls, Stephen Darwall, Richard Brandt, James Griffin, J.David Velleman, and Don Loeb agree. Sidgwick does not, however, hold such a view. Instead, he offers a neglected criticism of full information accounts. Sidgwick writes that "a man's future good on the whole is what he would now desire and seek on the whole if all the consequences of all the different lines of conduct open to him were accurately foreseen and adequately realized in imagination at the present point of time. He comments that "the notion of "Good' thus attained has an ideal element: it is something that is not always actually desired and aimed at by human beings: but the ideal element is entirely interpretable in terms of fact, actual or hypothetical, and does not introduce any judgment of value, fundamentally distinct from judgments relating to existence; -still less any 'dicate of Reason." In the next paragraph, Sidgwick rejects this account of "good."

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