A Defense of "A Defense of Abortion": On the Responsibility Objection to Thomson's Argument  

Oleh:

Boonin-Vail, David

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 107 no. 2 (Jan. 1997), page 286-313.
Topik: Responsibility; Thomson; Argument; Abortion; Judith Jarvis

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.5 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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In her 1971 article, "A Defense of Abortion,"Judith Jarvis Thomson defended the following thesis: the impermissibilty of abortion does not follow from the premises that every fetus is a person and that every person has a right to life. Her principal argument in support of this thesis turned on the claim that cases of woman carrying a pregnancy to term shpuld be subsumed under the broader category of Good Samaritanism. From the moral point of view, that is, a woman who carries a pregnancy to term is like a person who generously offers, but does not have the right to, while a woman who terminates a pregnancy is like person who declines to offer such assistance. It is not the case that abortion violates the requirements of morality, therefore, but rather that continuing to incur the burdens involved in pregnancy goes beyond them. And her principal argument in support of this claim in turn rested on your sharing her response to a now (in) famous example: circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own.

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