The Resilience of the Allais Paradox  

Oleh:

Weber, Michael

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 109 no. 1 (Oct. 1998), page 94-118.
Topik: The Resilience of the Allais Paradox

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.8 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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The same basic change is frequently leveled against utilitarianism and its counterpart in the theory of rational choice, orthodox Bayesian decision theory. Both, it is claimed, conflict with common sense. Utilitarianism conflicts with common sense, it is said, because it recommends actions which harm an "innocent" person for the sake of the greater good. Orthodox decision theory conflicts with common sense because in the Allais Paradox, which will be my concern here, people frequently endorse preferences that violate the central axiom of orthodox decision theory, what Savage calls the "sure-thing" principle. Many defenders of utilitariansm respond to the change by arguing that when certain "remote effects" are taken into account, such courses of action are not utility maximizing. Utilitarianism, its defenders claim, therefore does not radically diverge from common sense. One such remote effect that utilitarianism have appealed ti is the devastating psychological effect on the person (s) who must inflict harm on the innocent person: it will lead to terrible feelings, feelings of horror and guilt. Perhaps unsurprisingly, some defenders of orthodox decision theory adopt a similar defense against the charge.

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