Biocentrism and the Concept of Life  

Oleh:

Agar, Nicholas

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 108 no. 1 (Oct. 1997), page 147-168.
Topik: Biocentrism; Concept of Life; Life; Organism Morally

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.4 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Rain forests and coral reefs are filled with living things. The biocentrist attempts to derive robust ethical safeguards for the enviromental from the cliam that merely being alive carries moral significance. Unfortunately, there are serious doubts about the fitness of the concept of life to play such a mjor role in moral theory. Compare "life" with "sentience" or intentional states might make an organism morally significant; sentient beings can suffer or experience enjoyment and intentional states allow the formation of projects that can be carried out or frustrated. "Life" does not seem to be similarly connected to normative concepts. This article starts with quick criticism of recent attempts to put life at the center of an enviromental ethic. In order to mkae progress we need to define life. I urge a definitional pluralism that gives some latitude to different theoretical needs. The enviromental ethicists requires a morally speciialized conception of life. To meet this need I propose an account that makes central the possession of repsentationally guided movement devices. I defend the moral importance of this notion againts the backdrop aof a general story about how properties unearthed by science can be eligible for moral considerability. The theory arrived at not only allows value to be spread very broadly, but also contains a mechanism for resolving conflicts generated by the inevitable competing claims.

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