Belef, Reason, and Motivation: Michael Smith's The Moral Problem  

Oleh:

Copp, David

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 108 no. 1 (Oct. 1997), page 33-54.
Topik: Kepercayaan; Reson; Motivation; Moral Problem

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.4 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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For Michael Smith, the central problem in moral theory is to resolve a tension among three intuitively plausible doctrines. The first, the "objectivity thesis," is the doctrine that moral judgments are beliefs about "objective matters of fact". " The second, the "practicality requirement, "is a doctrine to the effect that moral judgment can be sufficient to explain action, ceteris paribus. The thrid is Humean belief-desire psychology. According to the Humean view, if a moral judgments can be sufficient to explain action, it must be or involve a desire. If so, however, then it cannot be simply a belief. This, in summary, is "the moral problem. Smith presnts this problem in an admirably claer way as consisting in a tension among three propositions, one for each of the doctrines. If the three propositions were strictly inconsistent, we would have no alternative but to give up least one of them. Yet in several forsefully argued chapters, Smith offers theoretical consideration in support of each of the propositions. If he is correct, we must find a way to hold all three. Smith aims to do exactly this, which makes his project especially noteworthy

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